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THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT OF 
1978-THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
TO UNITED STATES v. MILLER: A 
PROCEDURAL RIGHT TO CHALLENGE 
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO FINANCIAL 
RECORDS 
Nancy M. Kirschner* 
The question of whether customer records maintained by a 
financial institution should be legally protected has been vigor-
ously discussed, analyzed, and debated by legislators, judges, 
bankers, law enforcement officials, educators, and privacy advo-
cates since 1973.1 Interaction with one's bank is "not entirely 
volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life 
of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account."2 
Thus, financial records are, in the words of Justice Douglas, a 
"virtual biography." That is, a person is defined by the checks 
he writes; banking transactions can indicate a person's "religion, 
ideology, opinions, and interest. " 3 
Such a biography, however, may be a dangerously inaccurate 
reflection of an individual's life. One commentator cautions that 
the information in an individual's checking account may actually 
be a distorted mirror of his life. He stated, for example, that 
the amount of money that passes through my liquor store 
in my personal checks is no true reflection of the amount 
of liquor I consume (because I often cash checks there) nor 
is a check payable to a particular publisher evidence of my 
reading tastes (I buy gift subscriptions for others and sub-
• Attorney at Law, San Francisco, California. Member of the California Bar. B.A., 
1970, Washington University, M.U.P., 1975, New York University; J.D., 1979, Rutgers 
University-Newark. 
1 The Safe Banking Act of 1977, H.R. 9086, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking 
Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, 1449 (1977) (statement of Con-
gressman St. Germain) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking 
Act]. 
2 Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247, 529 P.2d 590,596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 
172 (1974). 
1 California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
10 
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scribe to publications for professional not personal rea-
sons)} 
11 
It was not surprising that in 1977 the congressionally created 
Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) stated that in the 
last ten years significant changes in technology and development 
in social and economic systems have changed the relationships 
between an individual, his financial institution, and the federal 
government. Nor was it surprising to learn that the collection of 
information about individuals enhances the government's au-
thority and creates a danger of governmental abuse against which 
the Constitution seeks to protect citizens.5 
Most Americans already knew that modern economic relation-
ships are built on sophisticated systems involving third party 
payments8 and that records kept in connection with these third 
party payments contained unprecedented detail about an indi-
vidual. They were also aware that systems are automated so that 
the most current detail on the individual is both readily available 
and easily retrievable. What surprised many Americans was that 
the government freely avails itself of this information without 
notifying the person whose record it uses. Worse still, they 
learned that the United States Supreme Court ruled in United 
States v. Miller1 that these records were the property of the finan-
cial institution and, thus, beyond the individual's control. 
The transactional records which a checking account creates 
today are ones which formerly would have been kept in the exclu-
sive possession of the individual. These records would have ex-
isted a century ago in the form of receipts or-at most-ledger 
entries. As long as the records remained in an individual's posses-
sion, the law recognized his right to control their use or disclosure, 
and the government in particular was restricted in its ability to 
gain access to them, even to facilitate a criminal prosecution.8 
Prior to computer banking, the bank returned cancelled checks 
• Electronic Funds Transfer and Financial Privacy, S.2096, S.2293, S.1460, Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1978) (statement of Robert Ellis Smith) 
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S. 1460). 
• PRlvACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 
3-4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL PmvACY REPoRT). 
• The most typical example of third party payment is the personal check. The payor 
draws a check on his bank to pay the payee and the bank pays on presentment. 
' United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). For a brief discussion of Miller, see notes 
52-59 and accompanying text infra. 
• The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wanants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause .... " 
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to the customer and retained only a record of the amounts. The 
monthly statement showed both the amounts and the dates. Once 
the banks returned the checks they had no way of knowing to 
whom those checks were paid or from where the deposits came,. 
The bank's sole interest was in seeing that their books were bal-
anced. Thus, the customer had in his possession the only copy of 
his cancelled checks and law enforcement authorities needed a 
search warrant to get them. 
The Bank Secrecy Act9 and the Supreme Court's ruling in 
United States v. Miller'0 changed this state of affairs. The Bank 
Secrecy Act, passed in 1970, was a well-intentioned effort to curb 
white collar crime, federal tax evasion, and the practice of 
"skimming." 11 It requires the institution to copy and to keep re-
cords of customer transactions. Under the Act, bankers are liable 
for not reporting unusual cash transactions. To protect them-
selves, bankers began to record and maintain records of all types 
of customer transactions. 
In Miller, the Court ruled in favor of law enforcement needs in 
the banking area by holding that a bank customer has no stand-
ing to contest government access to his bank records. 12 This deci-
sion came only two years after the California Supreme Court had 
ruled in Burrows v. Superior Court 13 that financial records were 
protected by the California Constitution, which is identical in 
wording to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, and that a bank customer has a legitimate expectation of 
confidentiality in those records. 
Efforts to enact financial privacy legislation began in 1973 after 
Miller held that the Bank Secrecy Act is constitutional. Support 
for reform was sparked by frightening accounts of governmental 
abuse of personal financial information made possible by the 
compulsory record-keeping requirements of the Act. Daily reports 
of Watergate, "black bag jobs," electronic surveillance, and 
"enemies lists" broadened public awareness of the problem and 
made such legislation politically feasible. Congressman Fortney 
Stark, 14 a former banker, led the fight for financial privacy legisla-
tion. According to Stark, the Bank Secrecy Act created a tremen-
• 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-55 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1976). 
10 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
11 "Skimming" is the practice of getting cash out of the gambling casinos and into secret 
foreign bank accounts, thereby avoiding taxes. 
12 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
1• 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). 
14 Congressman Fortney H. Stark was the unsuccessful depositor plaintiff in California 
Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). For a discussion of Schultz, see notes 45-51 
and accompanying text infra. 
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dous threat to privacy, particularly in light of the fact that bank-
ers and their customers have developed a tradition of confiden-
tiality which customers expect their bankers to honor.15 With 
institutions maintaining such records the individual loses control 
over who might see or use them.18 
In 1978, Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 
1978 as Title XI of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and 
Interest Control Act of 1978.17 The Act creates a new concept for 
the protection of citizens from certain governmental investiga-
tions which are not part of a legitimate law enforcement inquiry. 
In effect, the Act tries to balance the needs of government against 
the need for individual privacy. "A delicate balance must be 
struck because the claims on both sides are legitimate."18 
The right to financial privacy goes to the heart of the tension 
between an individual's right to conduct his business without 
governmental intrusion and the government's legitimate need for 
information in law enforcement. After enactment of the Bank 
Secrecy Act, the issue was addressed in two forums-in the courts 
and in Congress. 
Balancing these needs is a difficult task at best. Indeed, it may 
not be possible to achieve such a balance at all. Unforturiately, 
Title XI does not meet the challenge. It appears to remedy the 
consequences of Miller but, in fact, does not. This article will 
review the factors leading to the Miller decision and the legisla-
tive response to that decision. Part I will examine the bank cus-
tomer's expectation of privacy and the way Miller affects this 
expectation. Part II will discuss the congressional response to 
Miller and the competing interests which led to the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act. The Act itself will be discussed in detail 
in Part III. Part IV will evaluate the Act, and offer recommenda-
tions for reform. The article concludes that the Act, by adopting 
a purely procedural approach, fails to provide adequate protec-
tion to bank customers. 
15 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, at 1462 (statement of 
Congressman Stark). 
II Id. 
" Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100-1122, 92 Stat. 3697-3710 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3401-3422). 
•• H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE CONG. 
& Ao. NEWS 9375 [hereinafter cited as Title XI: Right to Financial Priuacy-Legislatiue 
History]. 
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I. GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO BANK RECORDS: A CUSTOMER 
HAS NO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. Bank Records and the Customer's Expectation of 
Confidentiality 
The customer's communications with his bank have often been 
characterized as "confidential."19 Commercial bankers respect 
this confidentiality and impose strict internal restrictions on in-
formation gathering and dissemination by their employees. Cus-
tomers expect the bank to honor in good faith the trust entailed 
by their relationship by refusing to disclose information concern-
ing their financial affairs. There has, however, never developed a 
"banker-customer privilege" similar to the attorney-client or 
doctor-patient privilege. Bankers have never been legally privi-
leged or immune from production of customer records. While 
bank records may be "confidential," they cannot be described as 
truly "private." The customer is concerned with the release of 
information, not with the right of the bank to collect transac-
tional information. 
The few courts that have dealt with tl;ie bank-customer rela-
tionship have recognized a bank's duty of confidentiality. Several 
courts found an implied contract which limited the bank from 
disseminating information relating to a depositor's account ex-
cept either upon the express or implied consent of the depositor 
or in response to a valid court order or administrative summons. 211 
As a result, bank records, though never accorded explicit con-
stitutional protection, were analogized to "private papers" pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. 21 The rationale for finding such 
a Fourth Amendment right had its origins· in Katz v. United 
States. 22 Katz suggested that property interests would no longer 
be the exclusive test of Fourth Amendment standing and that the 
Fourth Amendment protects people as well as areas from unrea-
" Right to Financial Privacy Act, S. 1343, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1976) (statements of A. A. Milligan, Harold R. Arthur, and Lucille M. Creamer) 
[hereinafter cited as 1976 Senate Hearings on S. 1343). See also Le Valley & Laney, The 
IRS Summons and the Duty of Confidentiality: A Hobson's Choice for Bankers, 89 
BANKING L. J. 979 (1972); PERSONAL PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 101. 
20 See Milohnich v. First Nat'! Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson 
v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961). 
21 See, e.g., Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652,542 P.2d 977,125 
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. 166 (1974); Milohnich v. First Nat'! Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); 
Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961). 
22 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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sonable searches and seizures. 
Katz, however, did not address third party records and the 
alternate holding of the case was that what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public is not private and therefore is not entitled 
constitutional protection.23 Thus, a communication the confiden-
tiality of which is dependent upon a person not revealing its con-
tent to a third party ordinarily lacks Fourth Amendment protec- · 
tion. 24 Cancelled checks are not considered to be confidential 
communications and a bank customer would therefore lack 
standing to contest an order to the bank for their production. 
The information contained in bank records, however, including 
where and how a person spends his money, could be considered 
the property of the customer. The courts which found a duty of 
confidentiality implied such a property right. 25 According to this 
interpretation, the information was held by the bank but the 
customer expected that the bank would not use it or convey it, 
other than in the course of its contractual relationship, without 
giving the customer notice of its release. Thus, the information 
was not truly "private" since the customer realized and in fact 
· expected his bank to release it under certain circumstances. The 
customer, however, expected that he, not the bank, controlled the 
decision of to whom such records should be released. 
B. The Bank Secrecy Act26 
In the late 1960's Congress became concerned with the unre-
ported flow of currency into secret foreign bank accounts. Govern-
ment investigators maintained that access to information con-
tained in bank records was absolutely essential for effective law 
enforcement.27 Voluntary record maintenance by banks, however, 
was frequently inadequate to provide the evidence sought by law 
enforcement officials. Thus, in 1970, Congress enacted the Bank 
Secrecy Act28 authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to pre-
.. Id. at 351. 
" See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749-52 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For a discussion of how this principle relates to the Miller decision 
see United States v. Miller: Without a Right of Informational Privacy, Who Will Watch 
the Watchers?, 10 J. MAR. J. PRACT. & PROC. 629, 637, 642-45 (1977). See generally 
Comment, Government Access to Bank Records in the Aftermath of United States v. 
Miller and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L. REV. 636 (1977). 
11 See Milohnich v. First Nat'! Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson 
v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961). 
,. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-55 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1976). 
27 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 118 (statement of Richard L. 
Thornburgh), 127 (statement of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.), & 128 (statement of Samuel K. 
Skinner). 
,. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-55 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 
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scribe regulations where he determines that the maintenance of 
appropriate types of records and other evidence by banks has a 
high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investiga-
tions and proceedings. 29 The regulations30 enacted imposed 
sweeping record-keeping and reporting requirements on domestic 
banks. Banks were required to report major currency transactions 
and extensions of credit;31 to copy all checks (both front and back) 
in excess of $100.00;32 to keep copies for five years; 33 to set up 
systems for tracing all large deposits for two years;34 and to collect 
signature cards, social security numbers, and names and ad-
dresses of each account holder.35 
The Bank Secrecy Act brought vigorous opposition. Bankers 
objected to being put in an impossible position between the legiti-
mate needs of the government and the customer's desire for confi-
dentiality. 36 They also charged that the costs of the recording 
requirements outweighed the law enforcement benefits and that 
the regulations were unduly burdensome.37 
To many, the very idea of compulsory record-keeping threat-
ened privacy, but Congress insisted that access to the records 
would be controlled by existing legal process.38 Floor debate prior 
to enactment of the Act reveals that House members were under 
the clear impression that government access to bank records 
would be limited to enforceable subpoenas.39 Even the Supreme 
Court, in upholding the record-keeping requirements of the Bank 
1051-1122 (1976). 
" 31 u.s.c. § 1053 (1976). 
30 Financial Recordkeeping & Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions, 31 CFR 
Part 103 (1978). 
31 Id. Operationally it was too expensive for banks to distinguish checks, and they 
routinely microfilmed all checks. See generally 1976 Senate Hearings of S. 1343, supra note 
19, for information on the way banks operated under the Bank Secrecy Act . 
., 31 CFR § 103.34(b)(3) (1978). 
13 31 CFR § 103.36(c) (1978) . 
.. 31 CFR § 103.34 (1978) . 
., Id. 
31 See 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statements of A. A. Milligan & 
Lucile M. Creamer). 
•
1 Id. 
31 The Senate Banking Committee Report on the Bank Secrecy Act states: "Access by 
law enforcement officials to bank records required to be kept under this title would of 
course be only pursuant to a subpoena or other lawful process as is presently the case. 
The legislation in no way authorizes unlimited fishing expeditions on the part of law 
enforcement officials." S. REP. No. 91-1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970). Similar lan-
guage appears in the House Report: "It should be home in mind that records to be 
maintained pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury will not be made 
automatically available for law enforcement purposes. They can only be obtained through 
existing legal process." H.R. REP. No. 91-975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970). 
•• See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 16963-64 (1970). 
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Secrecy Act, indicated that the Act was to be controlled by 
"existing legal process. " 40 
C. Challenges to the Government's Right of Access to 
Financial Records 
The government's right of access to an individual's financial 
records was challenged in California Bankers Association v. 
Schultz, 41 United States v. Miller, 42 and Burrows v. Superior 
Court 43 in which the customer plaintiffs asserted that they pos-
sessed an expectation of privacy in the information contained in 
the records which would give them standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to contest production of those records. Two courts, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the California 
Supreme Court, reasoned that the information in bank records 
made them confidential communications and that a customer 
therefore had a right to receive notice of his bank's intention to 
release the records and that he had standing to contest an order 
served on the bank. The United States Supreme Court rejected 
this theory in United States v. Miller" and adopted a traditional 
possession analysis. The Court held in Miller that a customer has 
no protectible interest in records held by a third party and thus 
no standing to contest their release. 
The first of the decisions concerning a depositor's right to con-
test release of his financial records by the bank arose in California 
Bankers Association v. Schultz. 45 The Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Bank Secrecy Act, stating that the maintenance 
of detailed records pursuant to the Act did not violate a deposi-
tor's Fourth Amendment rights. 
In Schultz, 46 several individual bank customers, a bank, the 
California Bankers Association, and the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) brought an action against the Secretary of the 
Treasury claiming that the Bank Secrecy Act and the regulations 
enforcing the Act were violative of the Fourth Amendment guar-
antee against unreasonable search and seizure. Plaintiffs con-
tended that when a bank maintains records under statutory and 
regulatory compulsion it acts as a government agency and 
thereby effects a "seizure" of customer records. The Court re-
" California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974). 
" 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
" 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
" 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). 
" 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
" 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
"Id. 
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jected the plaintiffs' argument, ruling that the mere maintenance 
by the bank of records which can only be disclosed pursuant to 
"existing legal process" is not an illegal search and seizure; the 
bank, it held, is a party to the transaction and not a neutral 
agent.47 The Court dismissed as "premature" the plaintiff deposi-
tor's claim that the Act's record-keeping requirements under-
mined his right to challenge a third party summons48 of his bank 
records.49 
One commentator recognized that the issue _presented in 
California Bankers was the point at which government seizure of 
records occurs.50 Under the Bank Secrecy Act, government access 
to bank records involves a two-step procedure: first, the govern-
ment requires the bank to copy customer checks, deposit slips, 
and other documents and, second, it orders the bank to hand over 
those records. California Bankers held that seizure does not occur 
at the record-keeping phase because the government has not yet 
acquired the records. When the government actually obtains the 
records, the customer's Fourth Amendment challenge to the third 
party summons is misplaced because the records are seized from 
the bank rather than from the customer himself. In dissent, Jus-
tice Marshall said of the majority's decision: "[T]he majority 
engages in a hollow charade whereby Fourth Amendment claims 
are to be labeled premature until such time as they can be 
deemed too late. " 51 
The Court's decision left the "seizure" question undecided. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached this question 
in United States v. Miller52 when a bank customer challenged the 
government's right of access to his bank records. Mitchell Miller 
was indicted for various federal offenses in connection with the 
operation of a still. Prior to the indictment, agents from the 
Treasury presented grand jury subpoenas which were issued in 
blank by a clerk of the district court and completed by the United 
States Attorney's Office to the presidents of two banks where 
Miller maintained accounts. The banks did not advise Miller that 
the subpoenas had been served but ordered their employees to 
make the records available and to provide copies of any docu-
ments the agents desired. The documents supplied included all 
checks, deposit slips, two financial statements, and three 
" Id. But see 416 U.S. at 95-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
•• A third party summons is a summons issued to a party other than the subject for 
production of the subject's records. 
" 416 U.S. 21, 56 (1974). 
00 See Comment, supra note 24, at 640-41. 
• 1 416 U.S. 21, 97 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
52 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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monthly statements. Subsequent to the indictment, Miller made 
a pre-trial motion to suppress the checks and bank records. He 
alleged that the grand jury subpoenas served on the banks were 
defective53 and that the evidence was illegally seized in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. 54 
The district court denied the motion. The records were intro-
duced and they helped to establish three overt acts against 
Miller. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
Miller was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the use of a 
defective subpoena to obtain copies of his bank records consti-
tuted an illegal search and seizure. 58 The court held that the 
government could not circumvent Boyd v. United States58 by 
"first requiring a third party bank to copy all depositor's personal 
checks and then, with an improper invocation of legal process, 
call upon the bank to allow inspection and reproduction of these 
copies. " 57 The court distinguished California Bankers on the 
ground that the Supreme Court, far from "proclaiming open sea-
son on personal bank records," had relied on the fact that access 
to the records was to be controlled by "existing legal process."58 
The subpoenas were thus defective and did not constitute ade-
quate legal process. Since the rights of the depositor were threat-
ened by the improper disclosure, the fact that bank officials coop-
erated voluntarily was deemed irrelevant. 59 
In Burrows v. Superior Court, 80 the plaintiff, an attorney, was 
suspected of misappropriating a client's funds. The police op-
tained a warrant to search his office. After seizing a number of 
documents, including check stubs, one of the detectives obtained 
copies of Burrows' financial statements from plaintiffs bank. The 
petitioner's motion to suppress those statements was denied and 
u The subpoenas had been issued by the United States Attorney rather than a court, 
no return was made to a court, and the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the 
grand jury was not in session. Id. at 756-57. 
"Id. at 756. 
15 Id. at 758. 
" 116 U.S. 161 (1886). In Boyd, glass importers were convicted of violating the customs 
revenue laws by filing false invoices. Thirty-five cases of plate glass were seized and 
confiscated. On appeal claimants maintained the invoice upon which the forfeiture judg-
ment was based violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The United States Supreme 
Court agreed and ruled that the seizure or compulsory production of a man's private 
papers to be used against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against 
himself. Thus, when the object of the search and seizure of a man's personal papers is to 
compel him to be a witness against himself, the search and seizure itself violates the 
Constitution. 
" 500 F.2d 751, 757 (5th Cir. 1974). 
11 Id. 
"Id. at 758. 
'° 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). 
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he appealed. The California Supreme Court found a right of pri~ 
vacy protected by Article 1, § 13 of the California Constitution 
and held that a depositor had a "reasonable expectation that the 
bank would maintain the confidentiality of [his bank re-
cords] ."81 The court ruled that the police violated his (the deposi-
tor's) rights by obtaining these records without legal process.62 
The fact that the bank had a proprietary right to the records 
was not dispositive since disclosure by the depositor to the bank 
was made for the limited purpose of facilitating the conduct of 
his financial affairs. Thus, his expectation of privacy was not 
diminished by the bank's retention of a record of such disclosures 
and the bank's voluntary relinquishment of depositor's records 
did not constitute a valid consent by the depositor.83 In a widely 
cited passage the California Court commented: 
[f]or all practical purposes the disclosures by individuals 
... [is] not entirely volitional since it is impossible to 
participate in the economic life of contemporary society 
without maintaining a bank account. . . . To permit a 
police officer access to these records merely upon his re-
quest without any judicial control as to relevancy or other 
traditional requirement of legal process and to allow the 
evidence to be used in any subsequent legal prosecution 
against a defendant opens the door to a vast and unlimited 
range of very real abuses of police power.84 
The following year the California Supreme Court extended 
Burrows in Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 65 holding 
that a customer's expectation of privacy in his bank records gave 
him standing in a civil case to contest orders for their produc-
tion. 88 The Court reasoned that the California Constitution pro-
tected a bank customer's right of privacy and that protection of 
his right should not be left to the election of third persons who 
may ha\'.e their own personal reasons for permitting or resisting 
disclosure of confidential information received from others.67 
Therefore, the Court held that before confidential customer infor-
•• Id. at 243, 529 P.2d 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 169. 
12 Id. at 245, 529 P.2d 594-95, 118 Cal. Rptr. 170-71. The California Court also stated 
that "a bank customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal pro-
cess, the matters he reveals to his bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal 
banking purposes." Id. at 593. 
13 Id. at 244-45, 529 P .2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170. 
" Id. at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172. 
•• 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975). 
" Id. at 657-58, 542 P.2d at 979-80, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56. 
17 Id. at 656-57, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555. 
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mation may be disclosed, the bank must take reasonable steps to 
notify its customers of the pendency and nature of the proceed-
ings and to afford the customer a fair opportunity to assert his 
own interest.88 The result of this decision was not to bar access to 
bank records; rather, it gave the bank customer a proprietary 
interest in his bank records so that he could protect the confiden-
tiality of those records. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Miller89 and 
held that a bank customer had no legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the contents of checks and deposit slips. The Court rea-
soned that checks are not confidential communications but 
merely negotiable instruments containing information which 
Miller had voluntarily supplied the bank. 70 The Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court stated, does not prohibit a third party from 
obtaining information and turning it over to the government. 
"The depositor takes the risk . . . that the information will be 
conveyed . . . to the government. . . . " 71 
Thus, the mere fact that the Bank Secrecy Act requires banks 
to maintain detailed financial records of customer transactions 
does not create a protectible interest in those records. The Court 
found that "unlike the claimant in Boyd, respondent could assert 
neither ownership nor possession [in the documents, 72 for] the 
records are the business records of the bank. " 73 
Under the Miller doctrine the bank had no legal obligation to 
notify the customer of the government's request for information, 
and, even if Miller had been notified, he would not have had 
standing to contest their production. As one writer has explained, 
"the Court's general conclusion that the defendant had no due 
process rights whatever to object to his bank's disclosure of bank 
records remained true even in view of [ California Bankers]. " 74 
The Court found that a bank customer had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy as a matter of law and therefore as a matter of 
law was not entitled to a vindication of rights he did not possess. 75 
Thus, Miller put to rest any uncertainty concerning the govern-
ment's access to bank records. 
11 Id. at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556. 
" 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
1• Id. at 443. 
"Id. 
12 Id. at 442-43. 
" Id. 
" See Comment, A Bank Customer Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of Bank 
Records: United States u. Miller, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 414, 432 (1977). 
1• Id. 
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II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO MILLER: 
PROCEDURAL RIGHT TO CHALLENGE GOVERNMENT ACCESS 
Miller states in effect that the government is not bound by the 
strictures of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when it wants to 
acquire financial records held by a third party. By denying stand-
ing· to a customer whose records had been seized, the Court de-
nied the customer the right to enforce compliance with legal pro-
cess.78 John Shattuck, speaking on behalf of the ACLU, said, 
"[W]hile [the Court] does not approve informal access77 to 
bank records, it refuses to recognize the only effective remedy to 
curb such access-[ the] opportunity for the customer to protect 
his ... own rights."78 
Even before Miller, members of both houses of Congress recog-
nized that the record-keeping requirements of the Bank Secrecy 
Act were being enforced in a manner Congress never intended. 79 
Prompted by the availability of records maintained pursuant to 
the Act, the number of requests for records increased dramati-
cally. Informal access became a matter of course.80 In fact, Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) investigators were encouraged to meet 
with and get to know banking officials to facilitate their investiga-
tions. 81 Bankers were under considerable pressure to comply with 
the informal requests. Banking officials either failed to recognize 
they had a right to refuse compliance or were unwilling to fight 
access on behalf of a customer in the courts. 82 
" PERSONAL PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 20. 
77 Informal access is access without authorization by subpoena, warrant, or other judi-
cial supervision. 
" 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of John 
Shattuck). 
71 See generally Bank Failures, Regulatory Reform, Financial Privacy Hearings on H.R. 
8024 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision Regulation and Insur-
ance of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 
526-28 (statement of Congressman Edward Koch), & 543 (statement of Congressman 
Fortney H. Stark) (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings on Bank Failures, 
Regulatory Reform, Financial Privacy]; 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, 
at 39-42 (statement of Congressman Fortney H. Stark). 
'° Id. 
" INT. REv. MAN. § 937(12), MT 9300-49 (2/19/75); 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, 
supra note 19, at 165 (statement of Hope Eastman); interview with Harold J. Mortimer, 
Vice President, First National State Bancorporation, Newark, New Jersey, April 3, 1979 
[hereinafter cited as Mortimer Interview]. 
•• 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 165. See also Mortimer Interview, 
supra note 82. See generally 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 44-112. 
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A. Foundation for Financial Privacy Legislation 
The Treasury Regulations83 implementing the Bank Secrecy 
Act became effective in 1972, just as publicity was being given to 
the government's abuses of personal privacy through domestic 
surveillance, electronic eavesdropping, the existence of "enemies 
lists," and manipulation of income tax investigations. Civil liber-
tarians feared that individuals targeted for investigation for ille-
gitimate reasons, such as political dissidence, might face addi-
tional exposure because of access to financial records. 
Congress responded to public concern for financial privacy leg-
islation in several ways. Between 1973 and 1978 no fewer than five 
separate House and Senate subcommittees held hearings on the 
issue.84 In 1974, pursuant to section 5 of the Privacy Act,85 Con-
gress created the Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) 
to study the possibility of extending the principles of the Privacy 
Act to private institutions. The Commission was directed to 
study data banks, automatic, data processing programs, and in-
formation systems of governmental, regional, and private -organi-
zations in prder to determine the standards and procedures in 
force for personal protection of private information. The Commis-
sion's 650 page report, Personal Privacy in an Informational 
Society, was submitted to the President and Congress on July 12, 
1977. On the basis of the study, the Commission was asked to 
report on such legislative recommendations as the Commission 
might determine to be necessary to "protect the privacy of indi-
viduals while meeting the legitimate needs of government and 
society for information. "86 
Coincidentally, Miller was decided as the Commission was con-
ducting its initial hearings. Commissioners later said that Miller 
underscored the lack of meaningful safeguards for the individual 
when government seeks access to records about him. 87 The impli-
•• 31 CFR Part 103 (1978). 
" Hearings were held in the 1975 House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Super-
vision, Regulation and Insurance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 8024, pts. 1, 2, 3 (i975); 
the 1976 House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations House of 
Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); the 1976 Senate Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States 
Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. on S.1343 (1976); the 1977 House Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, House of Representatives, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 (1977); and the 1978 Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institu-
tions, United States ·senate, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978). . 
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1976). The Act limits the use and misuse of personal information 
by the government. · 
., PERSONAL PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at xv. 
" FINANCIAL PRIVACY 1979, A CAPITAL REPORTS, INC. COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, Washington 
Credit Letter Privacy Report (ed.), Commentary by Milton W. Schober, Stephen M. 
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cations of Miller "crystallized their thinking"88 on the urgent need 
for strong federal legislation to limit disclosures of information. 
The law as it existed in 1977 gave the individual no leverage to 
protect his privacy. The Commission urged strong corrective fed-
eral legislation whi~h would give a "legally enforceable expecta-
tion of confidentiality" in customer records.89 This expectation of 
privacy would have two complementary but distinct elements: 
(1) an enforceable duty of the record-keeper which preserves the 
record-keeper's ability to protect itself from improper actions by 
the individual but otherwise restricts its discretion to disclose a 
record about him voluntarily; and (2) a legal interest of the indi-
vidual in his record which he can assert to protect himself against 
improper or unreasonable demands for disclosure by the govern-
ment. 90 At no time did the Commission recommend giving the 
individual complete unilateral control of his financial records. 
Another major congressional reaction to the government access 
question was the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 91 which 
raised tax returns to confidential status for the first time. In the 
case of a third party summons, that Act gave taxpayers or other 
persons to whom the summoned records pertain the right to re-
ceive notice of the summons from the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) within three days of issuance. It also gave standing to chal-
lenge enforcement of the summons.92 The Act provided for reim-
bursement to the banks for the costs of searching, preparing, 
reproducing, and transporting customer records and for the cost 
of retaining counsel to review the sufficiency of their response to 
the IRS request for customer records.93 
There is no evidence that the notice and standing requirements 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 have impeded either federal tax 
collection or law enforcement efforts. Furthermore, bankers 
maintained that the reimbursement requirement of the 1976 Act 
had several positive effects.94 First, it substantially decreased the 
Szekely, Capitol Reports, Inc., Washington, D.C. at 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
FINANCIAL PRIVACY HANDBOOK] (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW 
REFORM). 
"Id. 
" PERSONAL PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 20. 
•• Id. 
" I.R.C. §§ 7609-7610. 
" Id. § 7609. 
" Id. § 7610. Richard Fischer, counsel for Crocker National Bank in California, testified 
before a House subcommittee that "where they [IRS] were serving 150 to 200 summonses 
a month, they are now serving 25." 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra 
note 1, at 1514. 
" 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, at 1488-1502 (statement 
of Richard Fischer). 
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number of requests for customer records. 95 Second, after the effec-
tive date of the statute, IRS summonses were drafted more pre-
cisely and were much narrower in scope. "The difference is," said 
one commentator, that "someone is responsible for determining 
how much value those records.actually have in a particular inves-
tigation. " 98 
B. Impetus for Federal Financial Privacy Legislation: 
The Recommendations of the Privacy Protection Study 
Commission 
While the Tax Reform Act of 1976 addressed the privacy con-
cerns of bank customers in regard to IRS summonses, it left cus-
tomers unprotected from all other government agencies. The 
findings of the PPSC confirmed the fears of those who had sus-
pected widespread government abuse of customer financial re-
cords. Not only was the customer often not notified of an investi-
gation into his financial affairs, but even when he was, he was 
unable to challenge access. Furthermore, once a government 
agency obtained information from a third party record about an 
individual, there was virtually no control of its circulation within 
the government. After the PPSC study was released, Senator 
Mathias said at the 1977 hearing, "Without such Congressional 
action what recourse is there for someone who wants to keep his 
financial records private? Is he to abandon the bank in favor of a 
stuffed mattress?"97 
The Commission's approach to the government access issue 
had four objectives: first, to fill the constitutional void that Miller 
laid bare without unduly encumbering legitimate government 
access to third party records about individuals; second, to provide 
a strong safeguard for the individual in those record-keeping situ-
ations where they are demonstrably needed, i.e., where constitu-
tional protections for individual liberty and autonomy have been 
circumvented by changes in the character and technology of per-
sonal data record-keeping; third, to keep third party record-
keepers from being induced to hand over to the government vol-
untarily that which the government could otherwise obtain only 
through compulsory legal process; and fourth, to avoid a course 
of action that would delay and thus increase the cost of govern-




" Id. at 1513-14. 
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California law98 was the model for the Commission;s recom-
mendations. It recognizes an individual's legitimate expectation 
of privacy and thus provides a protectible interest99 in his bank 
records. The Commission recognized that two issues had to be 
addressed if federal legislation was to be as effective as the Cali-
fornia law: first, "voluntary" disclosure of information by third 
party record-keepers had to be limited by creation of a duty not 
to disclose information about an individual except in certain ex-
plicit circumstances; and second, the individual had to be pro-
vided with a legally recognized interest that he could assert in 
order to protect records about himself when government sought 
to acquire them from a third party. 100 
The Commission recommended creation of a "reasonable 
cause" standard, a somewhat lower standard than the California 
requirement of "probable cause."101 The government agency re-
questing the record would have to establish reasonable cause to 
believe the record was relevant to prosecution of a violation of 
law. The Commission said that "[w]hile appreciating the effi-
ciency arguments of law enforcement agencies, [it did] not be-
lieve that convenience alone should control policy judgments 
when individual rights are at issue." 102 
C. Legislative Debate on Financial Privacy 
The concept of a financial privacy act was introduced in 1973.103 
" California Governmental Access to Financial Records, CAL. Gov'T Coo&§§ 7460-7490 
(Deering) (1976). The Commission read this statute as interpreted by the California Su-
preme Court in Burrows and Valley Bank to mean that government must show that 
probable cause exists to compel production of bank records and that government may not 
request and receive an individual's records without employing legal process unless the 
customer consents. Personal Privacy Report, supra note 5, at 350-51 & 356-63. See 1978 
Senate Hearings on S. 2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 593-612 (statement of privacy protec-
tion study commission submitted by Carole A. Parsons). 
" See note 240 ancl accompanying text infra. 
100 The Personal Privacy Report stated: 
[W]ithout such a protectible interest in his records, an individual given notice, 
standing, and the right to challenge a government request for his records would 
have little basis for any real challenge, other than to snipe at the facial validity 
of a summons or subpoena and to question government's adherence to the proper 
procedural path. A grant of such procedural defense would not really recognize 
the privacy interest of the individual ... procedure alone gives the individual 
no tool to protect himself. 
Personal Privacy Report, supra note 5, at 352. 
1• 1 Id. at 363. 
102 Id. at 391. 
103 1975 House Hearings on Bank Failures, Regulatory Reform, Financial Privacy, supra 
note 79, at 543 (statement of Congressman Fortney H. Stark) & 526 (statement of Con-
gressman Edward Koch). For a history of the legislation, see 1978 Senate Hearings on 
S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4. 
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Early advocates pushed for repeal of the Bank Secrecy Act and 
adoption of strong federal legislation which would "establish a 
policy without ambiguity that one's bank records are simply an 
extension of one's personal papers protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.'' 104 That is, the advocates urged that bank records 
should not be released without a showing of probable cause to 
believe a crime had been committed. 105 
As the debate matured, the bills were revised and re-revised to 
make the legislation politically more acceptable. Some bills ex-
empted grand jury process while others exempted state and local 
officials. Some provided procedural safeguards while others re-
cognized a legally protected expectation of confidentiality. Bills 
were introduced which included all third party records. Others 
covered only bank records. The debate was heated and the lines 
of support were sharply drawn. 
Federal bank supervisory agencies generally supported the 
principle of an individual's right to financial privacy as long as 
that right did not inhibit the agencies' supervisory and enforce-
ment functions. 108 Civil libertarians and bankers also endorsed 
legislation to prohibit disclosure of customer financial records. 107 
Civil libertarians believed that the Miller decision seriously 
threatened First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights. rns They 
urged passage of a statute that would guarantee the customer the 
same interest in bank records as if those records were in his sole 
possession.'09 Such a statute would (1) prohibit informal access by 
federal, state, and local government agencies; (2) provide a cus-
tomer with timely notice of the proposed inspection; (3) provide 
a mechanism for judicial review of government requests for finan-
cial records at which the customer would have full standing to 
contest the relevancy, constitutionality, and legality of access; 
and (4) create criminal and civil remedies, including damages 
and return of all copies of improperly obtained bank records so 
as to deter and punish violations of law. 
In contrast to the civil libertarians, bankers did not advocate 
a Fourth Amendment right in customer bank records. Their 
'"' Id. 
''" Senator Cranston acknowledged that this was the toughest position one could take 
on the issue. 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 317. 
'"' See, e.g., letter of George A. Le Maiste, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, reprinted in 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 415. 
107 See 1976 Senate Hearings on S. 1343, supra note 19 (statement of Hope Eastman); 
1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1 (statement of John Shattuck); 
1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (statements of Robert Ellis Smith 
& Jeremiah S. Gutman). 
IOI Id. 
'" Id. 
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major concern was that under present law bankers were caught 
between the legitimate needs of government seeking information 
pertaining to illegal or criminal activities and the equally legiti-
mate interest of bank customers who wanted them to protect 
customer privacy,110 Bankers endorsed legislation which would 
establish procedural safeguards and would shift liability for im-
proper disclosure and the costs of compliance from the financial 
institution to the government. 111 
The strongest opposition to any financial privacy legislation 
came from state and federal law enforcement agencies. Financial 
records had become a precious tool for all law enforcement offi-
cers. State and local officials were successful in having state agen-
cies exempted from many of the legislative proposals. They 
argued that a uniform national policy would not only violate fed-
eralism but would also be counterproductive because there were 
significant differences between federal and state criminal justice 
systems. 112 Only a state legislature, they claimed, was in a posi-
tion to design procedures for disclosure which would "fit" with 
the investigatory and subpoena powers available to law enforce-
ment officials in a particular state,113 
Prior to 1977, federal law enforcement officials steadfastly op-
posed any financial privacy legislation. Officials of the Depart-
ments of Justice and the Treasury maintained that there was no 
privacy interest, constitutional or otherwise, of sufficient scope to 
support any restrictions on governmental access to financial re-
cords.'" 
The law enforcement officials believed the procedural safe-
guards of notice and standing to contest access would give crimi-
nals sufficient time to flee or to destroy evidence. 115 Of greatest 
concern to the Justice Department were provisions dealing with 
restrictions on access of federal grand juries to financial records. 
They attacked provisions which would give customers notice 
11• 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statements of A.A. Milligan & Lucille 
Creamer); 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1 (statement of 
Richard Fischer & Morris F. Miller); 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 
4 (statement of American Bankers Association). 
Ill Id. 
112 See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings on S. 1343, supra note 19 (statement of Peter Zim-
roth); 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (statement of Thomas D. 
Rath). 
113 Id. 
'" As one federal official stated: "[T]he privacy interest ... is far outweighed by the 
critical need of the government for such records in the legitimate pursuit of white collar 
and organized crime and official corruption.'' 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 
19, at 118 (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh). 
'" See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings on S. 1343, supra note 19 (statements of Richard L. 
Thornburgh, Robert B. Fiske, Jr., & Samuel K. Skinner). 
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and standing to challenge the grand jury's access to third party 
records and which would place restrictions on the use of financial 
records "for any purpose other than the specific statutory purpose 
for which the information was originally obtained." 118 
Testifying on behalf of the 94 U.S. Attorneys, Samuel K. Skin-
ner, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, said that, 
if enacted, the Act would seriously hamper the government's abil-
ity to detect and prosecute white collar crime and other crimes 
involving concealment of financial transactions. 117 The U.S. At-
torneys had four objections: (1) the Act would unduly delay in-
vestigations; (2) it would destroy secrecy and the ability of the 
U.S. Attorney's office to get witnesses to cooperate; (3) disclosure 
would permit subornation of perjury; and (4) it would create the 
risk of privacy which would be counterproductive to the privacy 
interests of grand jury witnesses. 118 
Until 1977 the Departments of Justice and the Treasury were 
successful in keeping financial privacy legislation in the congres-
sional subcommittees. But, in June 1977, Congressman John 
Cavanaugh, junior member of the House Committee on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs, introduced a bill with both Demo-
cratic and Republican co-sponsors. 118 The bill conformed very 
closely to the Privacy Protection Study Commission's report, and 
was based on the same two key principles: that the customer be 
given prior notice of the government's attempt to gain access to 
ba_nk records and that the customer be given the opportunity to 
contest government access in court. 120 Cavanaugh was successful 
in having the bill added to the massive bank regulatory bill pend-
ing in the Banking Committee's Financial Institution's Subcom-
mittee.121 
The Cavanaugh bill was substantially different from previous 
privacy bills. The legislation went through an evolutionary pro-
cess to address the objections of law enforcement officials. In the 
beginning the subcommittee members believed that there was a 
constitutional right to financial privacy and that any intrusion 
should be based on the standard of probable cause that a crime 
had been committed.122 The bill allowed an intrusion with a stan-
Ill Id. 
117 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statement of Samuel K. Skinner). 
118 Id. 




112 See, e.g., 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 39-44 (statement of 
Congressman Fortney H. Stark); 1975 House Hearings on Bank Failures, Regulatory Re-
form, Financial Privacy, supra note 79, at 564 (statement of Congressman Edward Koch). 
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dard for seeking information "relevant to a legitimate law en-
forcement inquiry"123-a standard substantially below the proba-
ble cause standard. 
While spokesmen for the Justice Department still warned that 
notice and standing would impede investigations, they took no 
position on the Cavanaugh bill. When it was clear that there was 
solid bipartisan support for the Financial Privacy bill, the Justice 
and Treasury Departments introduced their own proposal which 
gave customers a well-defined statutory right of privacy. Yet sub-
stantial differences between the Justice-Treasury draft bill and 
the Cavanaugh bill blocked any compromise between the House 
subcommittee and the Administration. 124 
As the legislative history reveals however, when it became ap-
parent that the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest 
Control Act of 1978 had a good chance of passage, the Depart-
ments of Justice and of the Treasury lobbied intensively in an 
eleventh hour effort to make substantial changes. 125 These 
changes were embraced in the so-called Cavanaugh-LaFalce sub-
stitute bill. The substitute was offered to the full House commit-
tee and was rewritten in the course of a morning's work. 128 Contro-
versy over the substitute focused on three areas: (1) whether the 
title should apply to grand jury process; (2) which party should 
be required to go to court first to challenge the release of financial 
records; and (3) when notification should be provided to the party 
whose financial records are being sought. 127 
The compromise amendments tightened and clarified the pro-
posal. Cavanaugh's bill as finally reported out of the full commit-
tee provided for "prior notification" to the customer of the ex-
pected release of records and standing to challenge the release in 
court. 128 At the urging of the Justice Department, a "healthy set 
of exceptions" to the prior notification requirement was carved 
out. 129 
The compromises that were worked out substantially weakened 
the protections the Privacy Commission considered essential. A 
customer was not given a protectible interest in his financial re-
cords; instead, he was given a procedural right to challenge their 
123 12 U.S.C.A. §. 3401(7) (1978). 
"' Officials of the Departments of Justice and of the Treasury threatened to recommend 
presidential veto if their proposal was not adopted. FINANCIAL PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra 
note 87, at 12. 
123 Jd. 
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release on the grounds that the records sought were not relevant 
to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry or that there had not 
been substantial compliance with the provisions of the Act. The 
customer had the burden of going forward; the government had 
the burden of proof. Congressman McKinney argued that the 
average citizen would now be faced with "a condition of taking 
on the whole U.S. Government. . . . " 130 
While the committee recognized that grand jury practices 
needed reform, they were persuaded that "the Banking Commit-
tee was not the place to do it." 131 Grand jury procedures were 
completely exempted from the notice and standing provisions of 
the final Act. 
The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 132 Title XI of the Financial 
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, 
was enacted in the last days of the 1978 congressional session. The 
Act was signed on November 10, 1978, and became effective 
March 10, 1979. 
Subsequent to passage, but prior to the Act's effective date, 
Congress voted to repeal the summary notification provision. 133 
That provision would have required every creditor and financial 
institution to give all past and present customers with both active 
and dormant accounts a one-time summary notification of cus-
tomer rights. •:u Not until the new Act was passed did the financial 
industry estimate that the cost of such compliance would ap-
proach one billion dollars. The estimates showed that some 75 
million households would receive an average of twelve separate 
notices under the Act "at a time when [a customer] would have 
little or no use for it. " 135 Congress reevaluated the provision and 
found that since the Act required a government agency to give 
notice when it seeks access to specific records, an individual 
would not be damaged by repeal of the summary notice provi-
sion.138 
,,. H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 237, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9367 [hereinafter cited as H-R. REP. No. 95-1383]. 
111 Title XI: The Right to Financial Privacy-Legislative History, supra note 18, at 
9376. 
m 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (1978). 
,u House-S.37 Repeal of Section 1104(d) of Pub. L. No. 95-630, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 
125 CONG. REc. H902, 906-07 (daily ed. February 27, 1979) .. 
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404(d) (1978). 
,u House-S.37 Repeal of Section 1104(d) of Pub. L. No. 95-630, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 
125 CoNG. REc. H902, 904 (daily ed. February Tl, 1979). 
,,. Id. 
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The Act prohibits federal agencies from obtaining access from 
a financial institution to· records concerning customers except 
through procedures set forth in the law. The term "financial insti-
tutions" includes all banking-type institutions as well as credit 
card issuers and consumer finance agencies. 137 "Customers" are 
limited to individuals or partnerships of five or fewer individu-
als. 138 Corporations, associations, larger partnerships, or other 
entities are not covered. "Financial records" means any original, 
copy of, or "information known to be derived from" a record 
pertaining to a customer's relationship with a financial institu-
tion.139 Financial records or information not identifiable with a 
particular customer are excepted, as is basic account informa-
tion. 140 The "information known to be derived from" language was 
inserted to prevent conscious circumvention of the Act. 141 
Under the Act, federal authorities may obtain access to a cus-
tomer's financial records only in connection with a "legitimate 
law enforcement inquiry. "u2 This is a new concept which is 
broadly defined as "a lawful investigation or official proceeding 
inquiring into a violation of, or failure to comply with, any crimi-
nal or civil statute or any regulation, rule or order issued pursuant 
thereto." 143 The statute as passed differs substantially from prior 
proposals which contemplated a much stronger showing as a pre-
requisite to obtaining the records of the financial institution. The 
"legitimate law enforcement inquiry" concept "seeks· to afford 
protection against obtaining individuals' financial records for 
improper purposes, without interposing a barrier to effective law 
enforcement. " 144 
B. Procedures for Access 
Access to financial records is prohibited unless either permitted 
by one of the exceptions to the Act, e.g., grand jury subpoena or 
IST 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(1) (1978). 
ISi 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(4)-(5) (1978). 
ISi 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(2) (1978). 
"" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(g) (1978). 
"' The definition of financial records applies not only to written records but to oral 
disclosures of information known to have come from financial records. FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 19. 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405(1), 3407(1), 3408(3), 3409(a)(2) (1978). 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(7) (1978). 
"' Givens, The Law on the Right to Financial Privacy, 181 N.Y.L.J. 2 (1979). 
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procedures; 145 customer authorization, 148 administrative summons 
or subpoena, 147 search warrant under the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 148 judicial subpoena, 148 or "formal written re-
quests," where no administrative summons or subpoena author-
ity reasonably appears available. 150 
Under the customer authorization provision, customers may 
authorize access to identified records by giving written approval 
for a period of no more than three months. Such authorization is 
revocable at any time before the records are disclosed. 151 The 
financial institution is required to keep records of the agencies to 
which customer authorization is granted.'52 The Act does not 
specify who is required to give the financial institution the au-
thorization, i.e., whether the customer himself must give written 
authorization to the institution or whether government officials 
may simply submit proof of authorization. 
Current law governing search warrants is not changed, but the 
government must notify the customer of the search within ninety 
days after execution of the warrant unless a court ordered delay 
is obtained pursuant to the federal statute. 153 Judicial and admin-
istrative summonses and subpoenas are judicially enforceable 
government demands for records authorized by some other provi-
sion of law. m Grand jury subpoenas are excepted. 155 The "formal 
written request" 158 is a new procedure which has been severely 
criticized. It is designed to allow governmental authorities which 
do not have authority to issue administrative summonses or sub-
poenas, e.g., the FBI and the U.S. Attorney, to request records 
formally. This provision is intended to replace the former practice 
of informal access with a procedure which includes notice and 
challenge rights. Unlike the administrative process, a formal 
written request is a noncoercive form of process and the financial 
institution may refuse compliance. 
Before records are obtained, a supervisory official of the govern-
ment authority must certify to the financial institution that the 
authority has complied with all applicable provisions of the 
"" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (1978). 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404 (1978). 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3405 (1978). 
"" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3406 (1978). 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3407 (1978). 
''" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (1978). 
1• 1 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404(a)(2) (1978). 
'"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404(c) (1978). 
,,. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3406 (1978). 
'"' 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405, 3407 (1978). 
, .. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (1978). 
, .. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (1978). 
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Act. 157 Financial institutions and their employees are absolved 
from civil liability for any improper disclosure if such disclosure 
was based on good faith reliance of the certificate.158 The three 
forms of process, administrative, judicial subpoena, and formal 
written request, require that unless a delay of notice order is 
obtained, the government agency seeking the record must notify 
the customer and give him the following: (1) a description of the 
records being sought; (2) a statement of the general purpose of the 
inquiry; and (3) an explanation of the procedure by which a cus-
tomer may challenge access in court. 159 The government must 
provide the customer with a copy of the process, a blank motion, 
and affidavit forms for filing in court. 180 The appropriate court in 
which a customer challenge may be filed must be listed in the 
notice. 181 Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) for adminis-
trative process and formal written requests and by 12 U.S.C. § 
3410(a) for judicial subpoenas.182 
C. Customer Challenges 
Within ten days of service or fourteen days following mailing 
(not receipt) of customer notice, the customer may file a motion 
seeking to prevent access. 183 To prevail, a customer must show 
that there is reason to believe that the records sought are not 
relevant to any "legitimate law enforcement inquiry" or that 
there has not been "substantial compliance" with the Act. The 
mere filing of a customer challenge action precludes governmen-
tal access to financial records until the matter is finally adjudi-
cated.184 
If the court finds that the required showing has been made, the 
government bears the burden of proving it is entitled to access. 185 
It must show merely that there is reason to believe that the re-
cords sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry 
within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency .188 The test for 
relevance is broad and encompasses anything that might be used 
as evidence or might lead to evidence. Put simply, the govern-
117 12 U.S.C.A. § 3403(b) (1978). 
, .. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(c) (1978). 




• 12 U.S.C.A. § 3416 (1978). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976); 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) 
(1978). 
,u 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978). 
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(c) (1978). 
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(b)-(c) (1978). 
118 Id. 
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ment need show only that the investigation is not "conducted 
solely for the purposes of political harassment or intimidation or 
otherwise in bad faith." 187 The "substantial compliance" lan-
guage is intended to insure that minor technical violations of the 
Act are not the basis for denial of access. 188 
The government's showing may be submitted solely to the 
court and not the customer if reasons are given which make such 
in camera review appropriate. 189 Factors meriting in camera re-
view might include the same circumstances that justify the delay 
of notice, namely, danger to life or safety of any person; flight 
from prosecution; destruction of or tampering with evidence; and . 
intimidation of potential witnesses or otherwise seriously jeopar-
dizing an investigation or official proceeding or unduly delaying 
a trial or ongoing official proceeding.170 Justice Department offi-
cials and subcommittee members agreed that the phrase "seri-
ously jeopardize an investigation or trial" is to be read narrowly 
and that it refers to circumstances which might reveal the iden-
tity of the target of the investigation (if the target was not the 
customer), the identity of an informant, or which might result in 
improper discovery by the defendant. 
The Act recognizes the need to expedite customer challenges: 
all challenge proceedings are to be decided within seven calendar 
days of the filing of the agency's response. 171 Denials of challenges 
are not final orders and no interlocutory appeals are permitted. 172 
Subsequent appeals from a challenge ruling may be brought as 
part of an appeal. 173 Because of the restriction on interlocutory 
appeals, the agency must notify the customer of a final order on 
any legal proceedings brought against him based on the records 
or it must advise him that no legal proceeding against him is 
contemplated. 174 The effect of an appeal after access is already 
accomplished, however, is unclear. 
The judicial remedies set forth in the Act are expressly stated 
to be exclusive, 175 and a customer is limited to challenges based 
on relevance and the agency's lack of substantial compliance with 
the procedural requirements of the Act. 178 The customer is prohib-
117 See 124 CONG. REC. Hll,737 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (statement of Representative 
Edward Pattison). 
118 H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, supra note 130, at 9355 (Section-by-Section Analysis). 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(b) (1978). 
11
• 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409(a)(3) (1978). 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(b) (1978). 
172 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(d) (1978). 
"' Id. 
"' Id. 
111 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(e) (1978). 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(e)-(O. See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978). 
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ited from asserting any defenses of the financial institution. 177 For 
example, the customer may not object to access on the grounds 
that the request is overbroad, vague, or unduly burdensome. 178 
D. Duties of the Financial Institution 
Financial institutions are obligated to assemble the records 
requested even during the pendency of the customer challenge 
proceedings.178 They are permitted reimbursement for the costs 
incurred in complying with the government's requests for the 
records. 180 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
is to establish a fee schedule to cover "reasonably necessary costs 
which have been directly incurred in searching for, reproducing 
or transporting ... " the data required.'81 
E. Use and Transfer of Information 
The Act sets new restrictions upon the transfer of financial 
records between federal departments and agencies. 182 Financial 
records may be transferred only after an official of the transfer-
ring agency certifies in writing that there is reason to believe that 
the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry 
of a receiving agency.'83 Within fourteen days after any transfer, 
the customer must be notified unless in connection with the origi-
nal access or at the time of the transfer the government has ob-
tained a court-ordered delay pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3409.'M 
These transfer restrictions apply to any inter-agency transfer; 
departmental transfers (e.g., FBI to the U.S. Attorney, within the 
Justice Department) are permitted without post-notification.185 
Subsequent use of the information, however, is governed by the 
statute. 1118 Notification to the customer that copies of or informa-
tion contained in his financial records are furnished to other gov-
ernmental agencies is required for transfers between federal de-
partments; it does not restrict transfers to or from state and local 
officials. 187 
m 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(0 (1978). 
178 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(e)-(O (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978). 
11• 12 U.S.C.A. § 3411 (1978). 
180 12 U.S.C.A. § 3415 (1978). 
'" Id. 
IU 12 U.S.C.A. § 3412 (1978). 
•u 12 U.S.C.A. § 3412(a) (1978). 
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3412(b) (1978). 
•u 12 U.S.C.A. § 3412(a) (1978). 
111 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(h)(4) (1978). 
117 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3412(a), 3401(3) (1978). 
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F. Exceptions 
The legislative history accompanying the Act reports that "any 
fears of unnecessary governmental restriction should be put to 
rest by the healthy set of exceptions that have been carved out 
in the Act. " 188 Indeed, some critics charged that the exceptions 
render the Act nearly nugatory .189 There are both exceptions190 
and exemptions. 191 Some of the exemptions are standing proce-
dures, and financial institutions are expected to be aware of them 
and honor them. In other cases, government officials must pres-
ent a compliance certificate to the institution certifying that the 
information is being sought in compliance with the law. 
1. Grand Jury Exception-The single most important excep-
tion is the exception for federal grand jury subpoenas. 192 Section 
3420 requires that financial records obtained by grand jury sub-
poena shall be "returned and actually presented" to the grand 
jury. 193 The records must be destroyed or returned to the financial 
institution if not used in connection with the return of an indict-
ment, a criminal prosecution, or a purpose permitted by Rule 6(e) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 194 governing secrecy 
and disclosure in grand jury proceedings. Financial records sub-
poenaed by a grand jury must be kept separate from other grand 
jury materials and used only in connection with obtaining an 
indictment, prosecution of the indicted offense, or a purpose au-
thorized by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.195 
2. Litigation Exception-The Act does not apply when re-
cords are sought through the Federal Rules of Criminal or Civil 
Procedure, or in connection with any judicial or administrative 
proceeding to which the customer and the government authority 
are parties. 198 Thus, even when the customer is a plaintiff against 
118 Title XI: The Right to Financial Privacy Act-Legislative History, supra note 18, at 
9375. 
111 See 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 581 (statement of 
Jeremiah S. Gutman), 587 (statement of David Linowes), & 613 (statement of Robert Ellis 
Smith). See also Palmer & Palmer, Complying with the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
of 1978, 96 BANKING L. J. at 196-98 (1979). 
1'° Exceptions are instances where the normal procedures controlling government access 
are either wholly or partially inapplicable. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3413, 3414, 3420 (1978). 
111 Exemptions are instances where the Act's provisions controlling government access 
do not apply. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission is exempt from the 
provisions of the Act for a period of two years. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3422 (1978). 
111 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (1978). 
113 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420(1) (1978). 
IN 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420(4) (1978). 
115 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420(2) (1978). 
IN 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(e)-(O (1978). 
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the government, financial records in the possession of federal 
agencies may be obtained without prior notice. 
3. Account Identification Information Exception-In certain 
specified instances, government officials are allowed, without 
notice to the indvidual, to obtain and transfer basic account iden-
tification information for a specific customer or an ascertainable 
group of customers. 197 More specific inquiries are permitted as to 
an account number associated with a particular financial trans-
action, e.g., a check forgery or a class of transactions, as well as 
of accounts associated with a foreign country .198 
4. Foreign Intelligence and Secret Service Protective Func-
tion Exception-The notification provisions of the Act do not 
apply to those government authorities authorized to conduct for-
eign intelligence or Secret Service activities. 199 These officials are 
only required to certify to the financial institution that they have 
complied with the applicable provisions of the Act,200 and the 
financial institution is prohibited from disclosing to the customer 
that such an investigation is being conducted.201 The Act requires 
government investigators to compile an annual tabulation of the 
occasions in which this exception was used. 202 
5. Emergency Access Exception-Government access to fi-
nancial records is not restricted by the Act in narrowly defined 
emergency situations where delay would create imminent danger 
of physical injury, serious property damage, or flight from prose-
cution. 203 Such records may be obtained only upon presentation 
of a certificate of compliance.204 Within five days of access, the 
government must file in court a statement by the supervisory 
official justifying use of the emergency access provision. 205 Unless 
a court order delaying notice is obtained, the agency must notify 
the customer of the access as soon as is practicable.208 
6. Disclosures by Financial Institutions-Institutions are per-
mitted to notify the government of possible violations of law.207 
They may not turn over records but may give sufficient account 
identification information, dates of transactions in question, and 
117 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(g) (1978). 
118 FINANCIAL PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 50-51. 
1" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(l) (1978). 
!00 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(2) (1978). 
201 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(3) (1978). 
182 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(4) (1978). 
203 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b)(l) (1978). 
204 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b)(2) (1978). 
200 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b)(3) (1978). 
1a1 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409(c) (1978). 
Zl'I 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3403(c), 3413(h)(5) (1978). 
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such other information as to enable government officials to inves-
tigate the suspected offense. 208 
7. Where a Financial Institution Is a Target-Where the insti-
tution is a target of an investigation, the government is allowed 
access to financial records without notice to the customer whose 
record is requested. 209 Such a customer record may not be used 
against the customer unless the regular access provisions of the 
Act are first employed. 210 The government must serve a certificate 
of compliance on the institution before records may be obtained 
through this exception.211 
8. Bank Supervisory Agency Exception-The following agen-
cies are listed as "supervisory agencies": the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the National 
Credit Union Administration, the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, the Secretary of the Treasury 
(with respect to the Bank Secrecy Act), and any state banking or 
securities agency or department. 212 These agencies have free ac-
cess to financial records when they are performing supervisory 
functions213 and they are permitted to exchange examination re-
ports and other information with each other.214 
9. General Accounting Office (GAO) Exception-The GAO is 
excepted under 12 U.S.C. § 3413(j). 
10: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Exception-Adminis-
trative summonses issued by the IRS are also excepted.215 
These summonses are covered by IRC § 7609. 
11. Required Report Exception-Financial information re-
quired to be reported by statute or regulation (e.g., Bank Secrecy 
Act compulsory reporting requirements) is excepted and may not 
be withheld by the financial institution. 218 
12. Financial Records Pertinent to Federally Insured Guaran-
teed Loans Exception-The Act excepts agencies which adminis-
ter federal loan programs from the notice and challenge provi-
sions where customers are recipients of government loans and the 
208 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(g) (1978). 
zoo 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(h)(l)(A) (1978). 
21• 12 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3413(h)(l)(A), (h)(4) (1978). 
211 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(h)(2) (1978). 
212 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(6) (1978). 
213 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(b) (1978). 
m 12 U.S.C.A. § 3412(d) (1978). 
211 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(c) (1978). 
211 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(d) (1978). 
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records pertain to the administration of those loans. 217 Before ob-
taining such customer records, the government agency must cer-
tify compliance to the bank218 and the bank must keep a record 
of all instances in which such access was granted.219 
13. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Exemption-The SEC is expressly exempted from the Act until 
November 10, 1980.220 
G. Remedies 
Government agencies and financial institutions are liable to 
customers for damages sustained due to violations of the Act. 221 
Recovery is one hundred dollars minimum damages for each vio-
lation regardless of the volume of records involved. 222 That means 
that if a financial institution improperly discloses customer re-
cords on two occasions, the institution is liable for a minimum of 
two hundred dollars• even if each violation involved several 
hundred documents. In addition to the minimum damages, the 
Act provides for actual damages,223 punitive damages, 224 and rea-
sonable attorney's fees225 for the successful customer plaintiff. 
Injunctive relief is also authorized. 228 
Financial institutions and their employees and agents are ab-
solved from liability for acting upon the good faith reliance of a 
government certificate of compliance. 227 There is no liability of 
individual government officials for damages, but the Civil Service 
Commission is authorized to determine whether disciplinary pro-
ceedings are warranted for willful violations of the Act, and the 
administrative authority is required to take the corrective action 
recommended by the Civil Service Commission. 228 
H. Reporting Requirements 
The Act establishes various reporting requirements. The Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is 
m 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(h)(l)(B) (1978). 
zu 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(h)(2) (1978). 
211 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(h)(6) (1978). 
220 12 U.S.C.A. § 3422 (1978). 
221 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(a) (1978). 
222 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(a)(l) (1978). 
223 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(a)(2) (1978). 
22• 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(a)(3) (1978). 
m 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(a)(4) (1978). 
m 12 U.S.C.A. § 3418 (1978). 
227 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(c) (1978). 
228 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(b)-(d) (1978). 
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required to file an annual report of the number of applications for 
delays and customer challenges made in the preceding year. 229 
The report, which must be filed with the appropriate congres-
sional committees, must include the identity of the government 
authority requesting a delay of notice, the number of notice de-
lays sought, and the number granted.230 In addition, the govern-
ment authority that requests access under the Act must report to 
Congress the number of requests for access made during the pre-
ceding year. 231 
N. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
OF Tm: Acr 
In evaluating the Act, it is important to keep in mind why it 
was enacted. Advocates of financial privacy legislation sought to 
achieve several objectives: to fill the void created by United 
States u. Miller232 without unduly encumbering legitimate gov-
ernment access to third party records about individuals; to pro-
vide strong safeguards for the individual in a record-keeping situ-
ation where the constitutional protection for individual liberty 
and autonomy have been circumvented by changes in the charac-
ter and technology of financial data record-keeping; to create a 
system which would provide a "paper trail" to identify by whom, 
why, and by what authority an individual's records have been 
examined; to keep third party record-keepers from being induced 
to voluntarily furnish the government what it could otherwise 
obtain only through compulsory legal process; and to avoid a 
course of action that would delay and thus increase the cost of 
government access without affording the individual any new sub-
stantive protections. 233 Unfortunately, the Act does not meet 
these objectives. 
As the legislative history reveals, Title XI is a decidedly pro-
government statute which fails to give customers adequate pri-
vacy protection.234 What is required is a better balance between 
the three separate interests affected by the Act, namely, those of 
the customer, those of the financial institution, and those of gov-
m 12 U.S.C.A. § 3421(a) (1978) . 
... Id. 
131 12 U.S.C.A. § 3421(b) (1978). 
132 425 U.S. 435 (1976). For a discussion of Miller, see notes 69-75 and accompanying 
text supra. 
m 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 602 (statement of Privacy 
Protection Study Commission submitted by Carole W. Parsons on "The Recommenda-
tions of the Privacy Protection Study Commission"), & 149 (joint statement of Congress-
men Ned Pattison and Barry M. Goldwater). 
"' See notes 119-31 and accompanying text supra. 
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ernment law enforcement officials. 
The 1978 Act is really a modified version of the Justice-
Treasury proposal. New substantive rights advocated by the Pri-
vacy Protection Study Commission were replaced by a procedural 
right to challenge the relevancy of the records sought to the law 
enforcement "inquiry," and the government's "substantial" com-
pliance in seeking access. Some Congressmen charged that the 
compromise was one-sided.235 Commentators in the financial in-
dustry and advocates of personal privacy called the Act a decid-
edly pro-government statute.238 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Act fails to give customers 
adequate protection. Nor is it surprising that the provisions 
which affect the financial institutions subject those institutions 
to civil liability and impose additional record-keeping require-
ments on them. Such compromises were required by the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Treasury. Without them, say supporters, 
the Act would not have been passed. 237 
If the fundamental purpose of the Act is to permit customers 
to challenge the government's access when their records are 
sought for improper or illegitimate reasons, the critical question 
is whether this can be accomplished in the face of the procedures 
established to protect those legitimate investigations. 238 The for-
mer chairperson of the PPSC warned Congress that rejection of 
the PPSC's recommendations and adoption of the Justice pro-
posal would seriously threaten individual privacy.239 The Act as 
passed does not insure the customer with the Commission's rec-
ommended "legal expectation of confidentiality" in his financial 
records.240 A citizen whose privacy has been violated by improper 
access to his records has no inherent right of privacy ori which to 
base a cause of action.241 By failing to create a private right of 
action for the individual whose financial records are sought by the 
111 H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, supra note 130, at 9366-67 (additional remarks of Congress-
man Stewart B. McKinney). 
131 See generally 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (additional 
statements). 
111 See notes 119-31 and accompanying text supra. 
131 Givens, supra note 144, et 2. 
131 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, et 588 (additional statement 
of David L. Linowes). 
uo In the 1977 House hearings on the Safe Banking Act, Senator Charles Mathies 
advocated the individual be given a proprietary right in personal records held by e third 
party. The Commission hes celled this proprietary right en individual's "protectible inter-
est" in his personal records. 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, 
at 1515. 
241 See generally 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (comments by 
David L. Linowes, Carole W. Persons, & Jeremiah S. Gutman on the compromise version 
of the S.2096 financial privacy bill). 
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government, the bill fails to incorporate the essential element of 
the legal mechanism which the Commission believed essential. 242 
Without this right of action no citizen can be certain that his 
personal privacy interests will be fairly weighed against the gov-
ernment's need for information about him.243 Unquestionably, the 
failure to insure a legal expectation of confidentiality in an indi-
vidual's financial records is the most serious defect of the Act. 
Moreover, the limited protection afforded individual customers 
under the Act is denied other bank customers. Protection is lim-
ited to individuals and partnerships of five or fewer individuals 
who utilized or are utilizing a financial service.244 Earlier versions 
of the legislation protected all customers, i.e., individuals, part-
nerships, corporations, trusts, and other legal entities.245 It is un-
reasonable to cut off the rights provided by Title XI on the basis 
of the number of individuals in a partnership or on the form 
which a group of individuals chooses for its business.248 Clearly, 
the definition of "customer"247 should be broadened to include all 
customers. Furthermore, the term should likewise apply to any 
person "who has applied" to utilize a financial service. 
Several other safeguards the PPSC believed essential were 
amended out of the Act and some provisions which the PPSC 
warned were dangerous to privacy protection were incorporated 
into the compromise bill.248 Specifically, the three provisions of 
"' Id. 
'" 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 593-94 (statement submit-
ted by Carole W. Parsons). 
'" 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(4)-(5) (1978). 
,.. Letter of Leland S. Prussia, Vice Chairman and Cashier, Bank of America, to Con-
gressman Harold J. Johnson, re: H.R. 13471-The Financial Institutions and Regulatory 
Act of 1978, dated September 12, 1978, attachment A, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Prussia 
letter] (letter on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM). 
"' Id. 
"' A "customer" is defined by the Act as "any person or authorized representative of 
that person who utilized or is utilizing any service of a financial institution, or for whom 
a financial institution is acting or has acted as a fiduciary, in relation to an account 
maintained in the person's name." 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(5) (1978). 
"" Specifically, the Privacy Protection Study Commission was concerned about the 
following provisions: 
[G]rand jury subpoena, whose use as an investigative tool has been extended 
considerably over the years, is exempt totally from the Justice Department's bill. 
That is, there is no requirement for notice, no standard for issuance, no opportun-
ity to challenge its validity, and no procedure for reporting the number or nature 
or these subpoenas. 
The standard under which government agencies are authorized to issue an 
administrative subpoena or summons, or court subpoena-"relevant to a legiti-
mate law enforcement purpose"-is not sufficiently well-defined to inform the 
record subject of the nature of his alleged misconduct. There is no requirement 
that the records in question be described in the subpoena or summons. 
The Act enables government agencies that do not have statutory ability to issue 
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Title XI which drew the strongest criticism from the PPSC and 
civil libertarians249 were: (1) the exception of grand jury sub-
poenas;250 (2) the institutionalization of informal access through 
the formal written request; 251 and (3) the customer challenge pro-
visions. 252 
The exemption of the grand jury from the Act253 is perhaps the 
most serious omission. From the outset, the question of whether 
to make grand jury process subject to the notice and standing 
requirements stirred great controversy. Law enforcement officials 
who fought vehemently for the grand jury exclusion argued 
throughout the hearings that the grand jury is the single most 
effective investigative tool in criminal law enforcement and that 
nothing should impede grand jury investigations. They main-
tained that grand jury practices were subject to judicial oversight 
administrative subpoenas or summonses to acquire this authority by internally 
promulgated regulations. This broad grant of authority to administrators could 
be a subversion of the subpoena or summons requirement. H Congress considers 
that an agency should have powers of compulsory process, it would grant those 
powers. [T]he standard of relevance to a legitimate law enforcement pur-
pose-loose as it is-would not even be reviewable by an independent judicial 
body prior to its issuance. 
The criteria for delaying notice to a bank customer that his records are being 
subpoenaed include a catch-all type of provision-"otherwise jeopardizing an 
investigation or official proceeding"-that could virtually negate the requirement 
of notice. 
The right of the record subject to challenge a summons or subpoena is severely 
limited. It requires the customer to present factual evidence that the records being 
sought are not being sought to obtain information relevant to a legitimate law 
enforcement purpose. It is almost impossible to prove a negative and particularly 
hard when the standard is so vague. Furthermore, placing this burden on the 
customer flies in the face of the more traditional practice of making the State 
establish its case first. This practice grew up early in our history from an under-
standing that the resources of the State substantially outweighed those of an 
individual, and that the consequences to an individual of criminal prosecution 
made it necessary to weight the protections of the judicial system in his favor. 
The provision permitting the government agency to respond in camera to a 
successful showing by a bank customer that the subpoena is invalid, makes it 
impossible for the customer to learn the basis for denial of his claim. Here again, 
the individual cannot assert his position adequately in the absence of critical 
information-most likely information about himself. 
Finally, [ the PPSC was] concerned about the exemption of foreign intelligence 
agencies from subpoena, notice, or other procedures, particularly because there 
are no internal procedures required to determine the validity of requests, and no 
requirements on record keepers to so much as to verify the identity of the reques-
tor or the validity of the request. 
1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 588-90 (statement of David L. 
Linowes). 
"' 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (additional statements). 
tao 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (1978). 
111 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (1978). 
ZIZ 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410 (1978). 
113 12 U.S.C.A. § 3420 (1978). 
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and, even if the system is in need of reform, a banking act was 
not the place to reform it. 254 
Yet, by exempting grand jury process, the Act "pretend[s] the 
grand jury is something other than it really is."255 The grand jury 
today is not an independent investigatory body subject to judicial 
scrutiny but, rather a mere investigative auxilliary of the prosecu-
tor. Historically, the grand jury's broad powers to investigate 
alleged criminal conduct were justified only because they were 
balanced by the traditional requirements of strict secrecy. Today, 
secrecy with respect to recorded information has been eroded to 
the point that government attorneys and investigators have ready 
access to it. In essence, the grand jury subpoena may be little 
more than an investigative tool used to circumvent the stringent 
requirements of a search warrant. 258 Financial institutions are 
currently required to deliver documents to government prosecu-
tors without notice to customers either before of after delivery. 
Unjustifiable invasions of privacy are just as likely or unlikely in 
the context of a grand jury investigation as in any other law 
enforcement investigation. 
Nor are the arguments for exemption persuasive. If grand juries 
are in need of reform, and especially if grand jury process is being 
abused, it does not follow that grand jury process should be ex-
empt from the basic safeguards of the Act. "Grand jury efforts 
will not be unduly curtailed by requiring them to utilize one of 
the procedures for access provided by Title XI. " 257 
A second area of controversy concerns the new "non-coercive" 
administrative procedure, the formal written request. 258 Critics 
warned that this procedure provides access to all government 
agencies who did not formerly have such power and gives all 
government agencies an investigative arm.259 One banker has esti-
mated the Act opens access to approximately 140 administrative 
n, See 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statement of Richard L. Thorn-
burgh); 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1 (statement of Russell 
T. Baker); 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (statement of Benjamin 
R. Civiletti). 
,.. 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 585 (statement of Jeremiah 
S. Gutman). 
ZH 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S. 1460, supra note 4, at 590 (statement of David L. 
Linowes). See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The record shows that 
bank records obtained by Treasury agents may never have been presented to the grand 
jury which was the only body with a legitimate right to see them. 
217 Prussia letter, supra note 245, attachment A, at 5. Title XI is codified at 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3408 (1978). 
w 12 U.S.C.A. § 3405 (1978). See note 248 and accompanying text supra . 
.. , 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 582 (statement of Jeremiah 
S. Gutman), 588 (statement of David L. Linowes), & 637-38 (statement of James Brown). 
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agencies.280 The new procedure gives those agencies which do not 
presently have statutory authority to issue administrative sub-
poenas or summonses the authority to acquire this power. Agen-
cies may now promulgate rules governing the issuance of adminis-
trative summonses.281 Until Title XI, Congress specifically failed 
to give many agencies the powers of compulsory process. The Act 
eliminates the distinction between those with and those without 
such power, and gives investigatory power to all federal agencies. 
If Congress deemed some agencies not sufficiently significant to 
be given subpoena power, the Act's broad delegation of such au-
thority is indefensible. 282 
Law enforcement officials have defended the procedure, saying 
it both provides privacy protection and does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 283 They maintain that it is subject to the 
notice requirements and standing grants, and that it is "non-
coercive," in the sense that an institution may refuse to honor the 
request. 284 In practice, however, the ability of the institution to 
decline to comply may be of limited value as privacy protection. 
The statute285 puts the financial institution in a difficult position. 
Before it can comply, the institution must determine that: (1) 
there is no administrative subpoena or summons authority avail-
able; (2) the request is authorized by regulations (and each 
agency has its own internal regulations); and (3) there is reason 
to believe the records sought are relevant to a law enforcement 
inquiry. If it does comply and the agency did not have the re-
quired authority, the financial institution may be liable to the 
customer for improper release of records. If a bank officer does not 
comply, there may be serious conflicts within the institution be-
cause the institution may be subject to regulation by the very 
agency seeking records of its customers. Institutions can be ex-
pected to comply regularly since compliance is the least chal-
lengeable way for an institution to insulate itself from liability. 
The new form of access vests too much authority in administra-
tive agencies. Agencies should not be permitted to determine 
whether or not they need subpoena power. Each agency which 
''° Lecture to the Banking Law Seminar by Harold J. Mortimer, Vice-President, First 
National State Bankcorporation, at Rutgers Law School, Newark, New Jersey, April 3, 
1979 . 
.., 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408(2) (1978). 
m 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4 (statements of David L. Li-
nowes & Jeremiah S. Gutman). 
m See generally 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19 (statements of Richard 
L. Thornburgh, Robert B. Fiske, Jr., & Samuel K. Skinner). 
"'Id . 
... 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (1978). 
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wants such power should first be required to show the purposes 
for which the information is sought. The broad authorization of 
section 3408 should be repealed and Congress should decide on a 
case-by-case basis which of the government authorities do, in 
fact, need such power. 
The customer challenge provisions288 will probably generate the 
greatest dissatisfaction to individuals. Customers who are noti-
fied that their records are being sought are likely to believe that 
their privacy has been invaded. If they decide to challenge access, 
they will find themselves forced into the difficult task of trying 
to prove a negative. They will find that the grounds which they 
may raise are limited to "relevancy" and "substantial compli-
ance." Moreover, if they are successful in making the required 
prima facie showing, they will find limited opportunity to obtain 
information· about the inquiry because of the time constraints 
(seven days for challenge proceedin_gs and the provision for an 
in camera hearing). 
The challenge procedure itself is also defective. A customer 
must challenge government access by going to court.287 Earlier 
versions of the Act gave the customers the same right as if the 
records were in his possession.288 At that point the government 
could go to court to demonstrate the reasonable relationship of 
the ·record being sought to the law enforcement activity. The Act 
now requires a customer challenging the government to file a 
motion to quash the subpoena or summons or to file an applica-
tion to enjoin the government from obtaining financial records 
pursuant to a formal written request within fourteen days of the 
mailing of the notice. 289 The motion must state why the records 
are not relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry or in 
what way the government has failed to comply with the statute. 270 
Moreover, the customer must pay filing fees to challenge access.271 
Finally, the customer must make a prima facie showing that the 
investigation is not undertaken for legitimate law enforcement 
purposes or that the government has not substantially complied 
with provisions of the Act. 272 
It is unreasonable to require the customer to object by legal 
action while the government is entitled to seek records by infor-
211 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410 (1978). 
217 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(e) (1978) . 
... 1976 Senate Hearings on S.1343, supra note 19, at 9, 108, & 168. 
211 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408(4)(B) (1978). 
no 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a) (1978). 
n, The fee recently went from $15.00 to $60.00. Legislation has been introduced to 
reduce the fee to $5.00. 125 CoN. REc. H8645-46 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1979). 
m U.S.C.A. § 3410(c) (1978). 
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mal procedure rather than judicial subpoena. 273 The Act should 
be amended so that the customer may simply file written objec-
tions to the agency's access to his financial records. The burden 
would then be shifted to the government which would have to 
demonstrate a legitimate need for information. · 
To challenge access, the customer has only two options. The 
first is to attack the stated objective of the inquiry on its face. 274 
That, however, will be almost impossible since "legitimate law 
enforcement inquiry" is broadly defined. The agency can reply 
that the objective is to find out whether or not a particular type 
of transaction occurred and that it should not be compelled to 
take the customer's word that it did not. The statute does not 
require probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the records 
will show a violation of law; mere relevance is all that need be 
shown.275 Furthermore, 12 U.S.C. § 3410(b), which permits the 
government to respond to a successful showing in camera, makes 
it impossible for the customer to learn the basis for denial of his 
claim or to assert his position adequately. The statute should be 
amended to require the government to make a showing that an 
adversarial proceeding would be dangerous to an individual, or to 
show similar compelling reasons. 
The other approach for a customer who believes that a request 
for records has an illegitimate objective is to charge 
"discriminatory selectivity," i.e., that political, religious, or other 
constitutionally protected activities led to the investigation, or 
that the agency is discriminating on invidious grounds such as an 
ethnic basis. The customer will have difficulty supporting charges 
of selective discrimination in light of the seven day time limit on 
challenges after the agency response is submitted. A customer 
might ask the court to find the agency response inadequate, in 
which case the agency would have to elect to give more informa-
tion or allow the court to decide on the basis of the original re-
sponse. 
Former federal prosecutor Richard Givens believes some of the 
tensions in the Act could be resolved by providing the customer 
with a greater opportunity to acquire more information to chal-
lenge access. 276 Givens has suggested that since the difficulties 
which confront a customer attempting to block access are formi-
dable, increased attention should be given to false statements 
21• 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 583 (statement of Jeremiah 
S. Gutman). 
210 12 U.S.C.A. § 3410(a)(2) (1978). 
21• 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405(1), 3407(1), 3408(1), 3409(a)(2) (1978). 
271 Givens, supra note 144, at 2. 
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made by investigatory authorities in connection with access, as 
both to initial assertions concerning the legitimacy and nature of 
the investigation and to responses to customer challenges. 277 He 
suggests three possible remedies: (1) criminal prosecution of offi-
cials involved where unlawful intent can be shown; (2) civil suits 
for damages against the agency based on an inference that use of 
false statements violates the Act (suits against individual officials 
are prohibited); and (3) efforts to suppress the fruits of access 
where false statements were utilized. 278 These "illegal fruits" 
cases can be analogized to searches based on false affidavits filed 
in support of search warrants. 279 
The Act suffers from other weaknesses. State and local officials 
are not covered-only federal law enforcement authorities are 
subject to the Act. 280 There is no reason to believe inclusion of all 
law enforcement officials in the Act will violate the principles of 
federalism. The failure to include state and local authorities not 
only creates a tremendous opportunity for abuse, but it inhibits 
the growth of uniform rules for regulating government access to 
financial information. 
Presently, the Act permits state and local law enforcement 
officials to be used as "sub-agents" of federal agencies. 281 Federal 
officials can ask state authorities to obtain customer records 
which are protected by the notice and standing requirements of 
the Act. Those same records could be transferred by state officials 
to federal investigators so as to avoid compliance with the Act. 
Although this would appear to be a clear violation of the Act, 
there is no statutory prohibition against the practice. While the 
Act's definition of a financial record ("information known to be 
derived from") 282 suggests such transfers would be illegal, this is 
not enough. Language should be added to explicitly prohibit in-
tergovernmental transfers of protected information. Furthermore, 
criminal sanctions should be available as an alternate or addi-
n, Id. 
'" Id. 
"' See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), in which the Court ruled that 
where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement 
knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth was included by the 
affiant in support of a warrant, the defendant is entitled to a hearing. If at the hearing 
the defendant is able to establish the alleged perjury or reckless disregard by a preponder-
ance of the evidence and, with the false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining 
content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the evidence must be excluded as fruits 
of an illegal search. 
280 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(3) (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (1978). 
"' "[S]tate and local officials may act as tipsters and advise federal officials where to 
look for information but federal agencies must still use the procedures to obtain the 
information." FINANCIAL PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 21. 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(2) (1978). 
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tional means to assure compliance.283 
Other criticisms of the Act include the delay of notice provi-
sion284 and the emergency access provision.285 The broad language 
in the former permits delayed notification for reasons that "would 
otherwise seriously jeopardize an investigation or proceeding or 
unduly delay a trial. " 288 Critics contend that this provision could 
virtually negate the notice requirement. 287 On the other hand, the 
emergency access provision is tied to a vague standard, namely, 
"if the government authority determines."288 
Two of the Act's exceptions create different privacy threats. 
Those are the intelligence exception and the SEC exception. The 
intelligence exception is especially anachronistic in the post-
Watergate period. There is also no reason to except the SEC from 
the notice and challenge provisions of the Act. The SEC is simply 
another investigatory agency and should be subject to the Act's 
provisions. 
The Act as it applies to financial institutions fails to take them 
out of that middle position between the legitimate needs of the 
government and the customer's desire for confidentiality. Since 
the government is not required to deliver a copy of the subpoena 
or summons to the financial institution-a certificate of compli-
ance is all that is required289-the bank is unaware of what the 
government has told the customer concerning the nature of the 
investigation and the identity of the records.290 
Even if the institution would not be liable if it acted on the 
good faith reliance of the certificate, the goodwill of the bank 
which is so important to the banking business might be damaged. 
Bankers traditionally have respected customer confidentiality 
and point out that information once disclosed is no longer confi-
dential. Moreover, the bank is never advised that a customer has 
challenged access. 
Title XI also puts unreasonable burdens on the financial insti-
tution. The responsibility for record-keeping and customer notifi-
w Givens, supra note 144, at 2. 
"' 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409 (1978) . 
... 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b) (1978) . 
... 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409(a)(3)(E) (1978). 
••1 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 589 (additional statement 
of David L. Linowes). 
zu 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b)(l) (1978) . 
.. , 12 U.S.C.A. § 3411 (1978). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 3403(b) (1978). 
no In contrast, the California Government Access to Financial Records Act, CAL. Gov'T 
CODE §§ 7460-7490 (Deering 1976), recognizing the danger that the financial institution 
could give the government too much information, requires law enforcement officials to 
serve the bank with a copy of the subpoena or summons. See id. § 7470. 
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cation is on the bank. 291 These record-keeping and notification 
responsibilities should be on the government entity seeking the 
information, not the financial institution. If the institution must 
keep an examination record, the statute should be amended to 
limit such retention to a reasonable period of time. 
The Act also requires the financial institution to assemble the 
records being sought by a federal agency. 292 Financial institutions 
must assemble the records upon receipt of the request from the 
government.293 Time and money may be lost assembling docu-
ments which have been successfully challenged. 
Another potential hazard is the provision which allows finan-
cial institutions to report information which they believe may be 
relevant to a possible violation of law.294 James Brown, a leading 
consumer advocate, believes this provision compromises the fi-
nancial institution's functional role as agent to the customer.295 
It undermines the individual's expectation of privacy in his deal-
ings with his bank. It also places the financial institution in the 
difficult role of discerning what may be illegal conduct, a task 
for which it is unsuited and incompetent. Finally, the express 
authorization might even encourage such reporting. 
Title XI fails far short of its intended purpose. This legislation 
arose because legislators rightfully perceived a need to curb gov-
ernment access to personal financial information, access without 
notice to the customer and access that was not part of an appro-
priate law enforcement investigation. Unfortunately, the Act is 
not an easy tool to be used by bank customers who perceive a 
threat to their privacy. It is a complex obstacle course which the 
individual must run in order to avoid government access to pri-
vate information. 
CONCLUSION 
Customers consider their financial records private and they 
expect their banks and other creditors to keep financial informa-
tion confidential. United States v. Miller296 held that this was not 
a legitimate expectation and that a customer has no standing to 
n, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3404(c), 3405, 3406, 3407, 3408 (1978). Although several of the cited 
sections suggest that the government is responsible for notification, the reality of the 
situation is that the bank takes on this burden since it is the bank which may be held 
liable in a suit by an unnotified customer. 
m 12 U.S.C.A. § 3411 (1978). 
ni Id . 
... 1978 Senate Hearings on S.2096, S.1460, supra note 4, at 637 (additional statement 
of James L. Brown). 
115 /d . 
... 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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assert a protectible interest in the information contained in finan-
cial records. The congressional response was the compromise 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.297 Congress rejected the 
PPSC's recommendations for a new substantive right in financial 
records and adopted procedural safeguards in an effort to meld 
privacy interests with law enforcement needs. By providing pro-
cedural safeguards and nothing more, the Act superficially ap-
pears to provide privacy protection. Unfortunately, the Act fails 
to give adequate protection. 
Perhaps law enforcement would be inhibited if customers were 
given a legal expectation of confidentiality in their records. The 
price of such law enforcement efforts, however, is high. If the 
government did not require banks to keep detailed personal data 
on each customer, private information would not be in the posses-
sion of the third party record-keeper and customer privacy would 
be protected. If law enforcement officials were limited by law as 
to when they could use discretion, there would be fewer opportun-
ities for abuse of authority. If legislators simplified or deleted the 
record-keeping requirements and limited law enforcement au-
thorities to the traditional tools of search warrants and probable 
cause, both law enforcement and privacy needs would be met. 
It is unlikely at present that either suggestion will be adopted. 
As Congressman St. Germain said during the House of Repre-
sentatives hearings, the 1978 Right to Financial Privacy Act is 
"an elemental response" to the problem.298 Unfortunately, the 
contours of that problem are not yet clear. 
217 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (1978). 
211 1977 House Hearings on the Safe Banking Act, supra note 1, at 1449 (statement of 
Congressman Fernand J. St. Germain). 
